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Abstract
In recent years, many efforts have demonstrated
that modern machine learning algorithms are vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks, where small, but
carefully crafted, perturbations on the input can
make them fail. While these attack methods are
very effective, they only focus on scenarios where
the target model takes static input, i.e., an at-
tacker can observe the entire original sample and
then add a perturbation at any point of the sample.
These attack approaches are not applicable to situ-
ations where the target model takes streaming in-
put, i.e., an attacker is only able to observe past data
points and add perturbations to the remaining (un-
observed) data points of the input. In this paper, we
propose a real-time adversarial attack scheme for
machine learning models with streaming inputs.
1 Introduction
Over the last decade, machine learning has made great ad-
vances and has been widely adopted for many diverse ap-
plications, including security-sensitive applications such as
identity verification and fraud detection. However, recent re-
search has also shown that many machine learning algorithms
(specifically deep neural networks) are vulnerable to adver-
sarial attacks, where small, but carefully designed, perturba-
tions are added to original samples, leading the target model
to make wrong predictions [Szegedy et al., 2013]. Such ad-
versarial attack algorithms have been proposed for a vari-
ety of tasks, such as image recognition, speech processing,
text classification, and malware detection, where they have
also been shown to be highly effective [Moosavi-Dezfooli et
al., 2016; Cisse et al., 2017; Gong and Poellabauer, 2017;
Alzantot et al., 2018; Carlini and Wagner, 2018; Scho¨nherr et
al., 2018; Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Grosse et al., 2017].
Most existing adversarial example generation algorithms
require that the entire original data sample that is fed into
the target model is observed and that any part of the sample
can then be modified. For example, speech adversarial attack
algorithms typically design a perturbation for a given speech
sample, add the perturbation to the original sample, and then
feed the resulting sample into the target speech recognition
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Figure 1: An illustration of the real-time adversarial attack scheme.
The target system takes streaming input; only past data points can be
observed and adversarial perturbation can only be added to future
data points. The adversarial perturbation generator continuously
uses observed data to approximate an optimal adversarial perturba-
tion for future data points.
system. However, this approach is not always feasible, partic-
ularly when the target system requires streaming input, where
the input is continuously processed as it arrives. In this real-
time processing scenario, an attacker can only observe past
parts of the data sample and can only add perturbations to
future parts of the data sample, while the decision of the
target model will be based on the entire data sample. A few
concrete scenarios that operate this way are as follows:
Financial Trading Systems. Financial institutions make
trading decisions using automatic machine learning algo-
rithms based on a sequence of observations of some market
conditions (e.g., variations in the stock index). An attacker
may influence the trading model’s outcomes by carefully per-
turbing the corresponding market conditions. However, while
the target trading model usually makes decisions based on
a long sequence of observations, the attacker cannot change
any historical data. Instead, the attack can only add pertur-
bations to future (yet to be observed) market conditions, e.g.,
using market manipulations.
Real-time Speech Processing Systems. Machine learn-
ing based real-time speech processing systems (e.g., speech
recognition and automatic translation systems) have been
adopted widely, including many security-sensitive applica-
tions. An attacker may want to change the output of such
systems by playing a carefully designed noise that is un-
noticeable by the human ear, but will be superimposed on
the speech generated by a human speaker through the air.
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The attacker can only design such noise signals based on
past speech signals and superimpose the noise only on fu-
ture speech signals, while the speech processing system will
perform its task using the entire speech segment (e.g., a word
or a sentence).
When attacking a real-time system, the attacker faces a
trade-off between observation and action space. That is, as-
sume that the target system takes a sequential input x, the
attacker could choose to design adversarial perturbations at
the beginning. However, in this case, the attacker does not
have any observation of x, but perturbations can be added to
any time point of x, i.e., the attacker has minimum observa-
tion and maximum action space. In contrast, if the attacker
chooses to add adversarial perturbations at the end, the at-
tacker has a full observation of x, but cannot add perturba-
tions to the data (i.e., the attacker has maximum observation,
but minimum action space). In the first case, it is hard to find
an optimal perturbation for x without having any observa-
tions, while in the second case, the attack cannot be imple-
mented at all. To address this dilemma, we propose a new
attack scheme that continuously uses observed data to ap-
proximate an optimal adversarial perturbation for future time
points using a deep reinforcement learning architecture (illus-
trated in Figure 1). In this paper, we refer to such attacks as
real-time adversarial attacks. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study of dynamic real-time adversarial attacks,
which have not yet received the attention they deserve. The
closest related concept is universal adversarial perturbation,
presented in [Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018;
Neekhara et al., 2019], where the authors design a fixed ad-
versarial perturbation that is effective for different samples.
The main difference to our work is that the universal adver-
sarial perturbation is built offline and does not take advantage
of observations in real-time to further improve the perturba-
tion for a specific target input.
2 Real-time Adversarial Attacks
2.1 Problem Formalization
Let x = {x1, x2, x3, ..., xn} ∈ Rm×n denote an n-point
time-series data sample, where each point xi ∈ Rm; f :
Rm×n −→ {1 . . . k} is a classifier mapping the time-series
sample x to a discrete label set. The goal of the attacker is to
design a real-time adversarial perturbation generator g(·) that
continuously uses observed data {x1, x2, ..., xt} to approxi-
mate an optimal adversarial perturbation rt+d+1 for a future
time point t+d+1, where d is the delay caused by processing
the data or emitting the adversarial perturbation. That is,
rt =
{
g({x1, x2, ..., xt−d−1}) d+ 1 < t ≤ n
0 else
(1)
We define a metric m(·) to measure the perceptibility of
the adversarial perturbation; a common choice for m is the
induced metric of lp (p ∈ {0, 1, 2, inf}) norm. We then aim
to solve the following optimization problem for non-targeted
adversarial attacks:
minimize m(r = {r1, r2, ..., rn})
s.t. f(x+ r) 6= f(x) (2)
Equation 1 implies the constraint that adversarial perturba-
tion is crafted only based on the observed part of the data
sample and can only be applied to the unobserved part of
the data sample. Equation 2 implies that the attacker wants
to make the perturbation as imperceptible as possible on the
premise that the attack succeeds. Even without the con-
straint of Equation 1, directly solving Equation 2 is usually
intractable when f is a deep neural network due to its non-
convexity. Nevertheless, previous efforts have found effective
approximation methods such as the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2014], DeepFool [Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2016], and the algorithm proposed in [Car-
lini and Wagner, 2018]. However, all these methods require
full observation and the freedom of changing any point of
the original data sample, and therefore these methods are not
compatible with the constraint imposed by Equation 1.
Alternatively, a more natural way of describing this prob-
lem is to view the adversarial perturbation generator as an
agent and model the problem as a partially observable de-
cision process problem, i.e., the generator continuously ob-
serves the streaming data and makes a sequence of decisions
of how to make the perturbation. This formalism is equiva-
lent to Equations 1 and 2, but allows us to use the many tools
available for reinforcement learning (RL) [Sutton et al., 1998]
to solve the problem. Then, the problem can be described us-
ing a tuple 〈O,S,A, T,R〉, where:
1. Observation O: ot = {x1, x2, ..., xt}.
2. State S: unobservable hidden state.
3. Action A: at = rt+d+1, i.e., adding the perturbation to
the original sample at time t+ d+ 1.
4. Transition T : unknown.
5. Reward R: If(x+r)6=f(x) −m(r).
This means that the attacker performs an action at to emit
the perturbation valued rt+d+1 at t+ d+ 1 based on the ob-
servation ot, which will change the internal hidden state ac-
cording to an unknown transition rule (e.g., the state can be
the attack success probability, and an action could make it in-
crease or decrease). The adversarial generator will only get
the reward at the end. The goal of RL is to learn an optimal
policy pig : at = g(ot) that maximizes the expectation of the
reward. In this problem, the environment is the target model
f , and the input data distribution Px.
2.2 Adversarial Attacks Using Reinforcement
Learning
As discussed in the previous section, real-time adversarial at-
tacks can be described as reinforcement learning problems,
which are usually solved by using deep neural networks
(DNNs). RL-DNN based adversarial attacks and conven-
tional optimization based adversarial attacks (e.g., FGSM and
DeepFool) differ in that the former treats the original exam-
ple and the corresponding adversarial perturbation as the in-
put and output of an unknown nonlinear mapping and then
use a DNN to approximate it, i.e., use learning to substitute
optimization. In geometric terms, the attack model is trying
to predict the direction that pushes the original example x out
of the correct decision region using the shortest distance.
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Figure 2: A low dimensional illustration of how the attack model
predicts perturbations for future data points based on already ob-
served data points. The attacker is trying to push the original data
samples (shown as solid dots) from the decision region R1 to R2.
Without observation of x1, the attacker indeed has no idea about the
optimal perturbation direction on x2, but after observing x1, the at-
tacker knows the optimal perturbation direction on x2, i.e., up if x
is in cluster C1 and down if x is in cluster C2.
A challenge for the attack model is to “forecast” future per-
turbations on yet unobserved data. However, this is feasible
since, given a specific machine learning task, the input sam-
ple, although yet unobserved, will obey some fixed distribu-
tion (e.g., distribution of natural speech), and there usually
exist dependencies among the data points of the data sample,
which can be used to forecast some characteristics of future
data points based on already observed data points. We expect
that such characteristics contain information that can be used
to estimate an optimal perturbation for future points, which is
illustrated in Figure 2.
Further, another challenge of using RL to implement real-
time adversarial attacks is the sparse rewards problem, i.e.,
the agent only receives the reward at the end and it is difficult
to obtain an estimation of the reward at each time point based
on the observed data and past actions. For example, estimat-
ing the expected reward at a time point simply based on feed-
ing the observed (partial) input at that time, superimposed
with the corresponding perturbation, into the target model f
(if accessible) and using the classification confidence to cal-
culate the reward will not yield reliable results, because the
model’s prediction is not reliable when only partial input is
given. In fact, although there have been many efforts to solve
the sparse reward problem, many tasks still suffer from high
computational overhead and training instability. However, for
the adversarial example crafting problem, we could generate
many trajectories of observation-action pairs using state-of-
the-art non-real-time adversarial generation algorithms. This
naturally leads us to use an imitation learning and behavior
cloning [Atkeson and Schaal, 1997] strategy to overcome the
sparse reward problem. We discuss it in the following section.
2.3 Imitation Learning Strategy
Imitation learning is an RL technique that learns an optimal
policy pig by imitating the behavior of an expert. Specifi-
cally, imitation learning requires a set of decision trajecto-
ries {τ1, τ2, ...} generated by an expert, where each deci-
sion trajectory consists of a sequence of “observation-action”
pairs, i.e., τi = 〈oi1, ai1, oi2, ai2, ..., oin, ain〉. Such trajectories
serve as demonstrations to teach the agent how to behave
given an observation. We can extract all expert observation-
action pairs from the trajectories and form a new dataset
D = {(o11, a11), (o12, a12), ..., (o1n, a1n), (o21, a21), (o22, a22), ...}.
By treating o as the input feature and a as the output label,
we could learn pig : at = g(ot) in a supervised learning man-
ner using traditional algorithms.
Specifically for the adversarial example crafting problem,
we can use state-of-the-art non-real-time attack models to
generate “sample-perturbation” pairs 〈(x1, r1), (x2, r2), ...〉
as decision trajectories by feeding different original samples
xi and collecting the corresponding output perturbations ri.
Here, both xi and ri consist of a sequence of x and r, using
the definition of observation o and action a in Section 2.1. We
can convert each x and r to o and a, and then build a training
set D and use supervised learning to learn pig .
Choice of Expert
We use a state-of-the-art non-real-time adversarial example
crafting technique as the expert. Over the last few years,
many new attack techniques have been developed and shown
to be effective. These techniques can be roughly classified
into two categories. The first category includes gradient-
based methods such as FGSM, DeepFool, and the method
presented in [Carlini and Wagner, 2018]; these are typically
based on deterministic optimization algorithms. The second
category consists of gradient-free methods such as the meth-
ods presented in [Alzantot et al., 2018; Su et al., 2019]; these
are typically based on stochastic optimization algorithms.
Which method works better as an expert depends not only
on the attack success rate; other important criteria include:
1. Flexibility of adding additional constraints. There
are two reasons why we prefer an expert that provides some
flexibility of adding additional constraints besides making the
perturbation imperceptible. First, we ultimately need to learn
pig from the trajectories generated by the expert using some
supervised learning method, which inevitably will contain
some error. We can add some regularization on the trajecto-
ries (e.g., perturb only after a specific time point) to simplify
the supervised learning task, which requires additional con-
straints on the expert. Second, in realistic attack scenarios,
the attacker usually faces additional constraints, e.g., when
an attacker attempts to fool a speech recognition system by
playing the perturbation over the air using a speaker, the fre-
quency range of the perturbation is subject to the characteris-
tics of the speaker. In general, stochastic optimization algo-
rithms are more flexible than deterministic optimization algo-
rithms for adding additional complex constraints.
2. Attacker’s knowledge. The attacker’s knowledge re-
quired for the proposed real-time adversarial attack follows
exactly the chosen expert policy. Hence, the attacker should
choose the expert policy according to the attack scenario.
3. Determinism of the expert. While state-of-the-art ad-
versarial example crafting approaches are highly effective in
terms of success rate, there is no guarantee that the gener-
ated perturbation is globally optimal. Specifically, perturba-
tions generated for the same input sample using a stochastic
optimizing algorithm can vary with the random seed since
the optimization solutions might stop at different sub-optimal
points, which will make the mapping o 7→ a ill-defined and
increase the difficulty of training pig . Therefore, a determin-
istic expert is preferred.
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Figure 3: Illustration of the training process. Note that the output
action only depends on the current observation ot.
Computational Overhead and Speed
Existing adversarial example crafting techniques can be com-
putationally expensive due to the complexity of optimiza-
tion, e.g., the method in [Carlini and Wagner, 2018] requires
about one hour to craft a single speech adversarial example.
Stochastic optimization algorithms typically need to call the
target model (or the substitute model) hundreds or thousands
of times to find the solution. However, since we use a deep
neural network g to substitute optimization, no matter which
expert we choose to imitate, the computational overhead for
generating an adversarial perturbation for one time point is
fixed to be the inference time of g (denoted by tg , which is
the computational delay). In the real-time scenario, if the in-
put sample frequency is higher than 1tg , then the generator is
not fast enough to catch up with the streaming input. The
attacker then needs to lower the update frequency by modify-
ing g to do batch processing, i.e., generate a batch of nbatch
actions for nbatch future points in one inference, which could
lower the delay requirement by nbatch times.
2.4 Implementation
Once we form the dataset D = {(o1, a1), (o2, a2), ...} con-
sisting of observation-action pairs from the expert’s decision
trajectory, we form the real-time adversarial generator g as
a deep neural network and learn from the dataset. Note that
each input o is a sequence of variable length; so it is natural to
use a recurrent neural network as part of the network. Specif-
ically, the neural network can be divided into two parts: the
encoder and the decoder. The encoder is a recurrent neural
network that maps a variable length input into a fixed dimen-
sional encoding. We expect that the learned encoding con-
tains useful features from o; the decoder then makes the deci-
sion of the action, e.g., in the example in Figure 2, we expect
that the encoding expresses which cluster the data sample be-
longs to, and the decoder can find the optimal perturbation
based on this information. We can then calculate the error
between the predicted action and the ground truth action and
use standard back-propagation to update g.
Assume that we have nt trajectories and each trajectory
consists of n observation-action pairs. The dataset has n×nt
samples, which can be very large and will make the training
slow. In fact, observations from the same trajectory are highly
dependent, i.e., the only difference between ot+1 and ot is
that ot+1 has one more observed point xt+1; therefore there
will be a lot of repetitive computation of the recurrent neural
network (i.e., the encoder). In order to expedite the training,
we should train observation-action pairs from the same tra-
Algorithm 1 Real-time Adversarial Attack
Require:
Original dataset X = {xi} where each xi = {xit}
Non-real-time adversarial example generator (expert) ge
Phase 1: Generate Expert Demonstrations
Input: Original sample set X
Output: Expert decision trajectory set D
1: initialize D as an empty set
2: for each xi ∈ X do
3: ri = {rit} = ge(xi)
4: initialize trajectory τi as an empty set
5: for each time point t of xi do
6: oit = {xi1, xi2, ...xit}
7: ait = r
i
t+d+1
8: add (oit, a
i
t) to τi
9: end for
10: add τi to D
11: end for
12: return D
Phase 2: Train Realtime Adversarial Example Generator
Input: Expert decision trajectory set D
Output: Real-time adversarial example generator gr
13: initialize gr as a recurrent network with parameter θ
14: for each trajectory τi ∈ D do
. maintain RNN states for each t to expedite computing
15: for each time point t do
16: calculate the predicted action aˆit = gr(o
i
t)
17: calculate the loss l between the predicted action
aˆit and the expert’s action a
i
t
18: update θ to minimize the loss l
19: end for
20: end for
21: return gr
Phase 3: Conduct Real-time Adversarial Attack
Input: Streaming observations o = {o1, o2, ..., ot, ...}
22: at each time point t do
23: at = gr(ot)
24: execute action at
jectory in a batch, i.e., after obtaining at from feeding input
ot into g, we do not feed a new input ot+1 into g. Instead, we
feed xt+1 into g and obtain the output of g as at+1. Figure 3
illustrates this training process. Specifically, this approach
avoids any repetitive encoder computation and can be viewed
as a sequence to sequence training. Note that the predicted
actions are only dependent on the current observation (i.e.,
they are not based on any future observations), which is dif-
ferent from standard sequence to sequence training used in
other applications such as machine translation where the in-
termediate encoding contains information of the entire input
sample. The pseudocode of the proposed algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 1.
It is worth mentioning that although in this paper, we focus
on using the basic behavior cloning algorithm for simplicity,
there are many more advanced algorithms (e.g., Dataset Ag-
gregation [Ross et al., 2011]) in imitation learning and rein-
forcement learning that can further improve the attack perfor-
mance, e.g., it is possible to design a remedy mechanism for
the real-time adversarial perturbation generator that allows it
to adjust its future strategy if it realizes it has previously made
a wrong decision. Hence, formalizing the real-time attack
into a reinforcement learning problem is not only natural, but
also allows us to apply existing tools and algorithms.
3 Case Study: Attacking a Voice Command
Recognition System
In the previous section, we introduced the general real-time
adversarial attack framework in a relatively abstract way; in
this section, we further show how to adopt the framework in
a realistic task: the audio adversarial attack1.
3.1 Target Model and Attack Scenario
The goal is to attack a voice command recognition system
based on a convolutional neural network [Sainath and Parada,
2015]. This model is used as an official example for Tensor-
flow2, it is easy to reproduce, and has also been used as the
target model for attacks in [Alzantot et al., 2018]. We train
the voice command recognition model exactly as in the im-
plementation of the Tensorflow example using the voice com-
mand dataset [Warden, 2018], except that we only use 80%
of the data for training, allowing us to use the other 20% for
testing. Most audio samples are of exact 1-second length with
a sampling rate of 16 kHz; all other samples are padded to be
also of 1 second for consistency. The model can classify ten
keywords: “yes”, “no”, “up”, “down”, “left”, “right”, “on”,
“off”, “stop”, and “go”. The trained model achieves 88.7%
accuracy on the validation set.
The proposed real-time scheme can greatly increase the
real-world threat of the audio adversarial attack. As illus-
trated in Figure 4, compared to previous non-real-time au-
dio adversarial attack technologies presented in [Carlini et
al., 2016; Yakura and Sakuma, 2018; Gong and Poellabauer,
2018; Qin et al., 2019], the key advantage of the real-time
audio adversarial attack scheme is that only by using this
scheme the attacker is able to conduct attacks to an on-going
session, i.e., an on-going human-computer interaction, and
interfere with the voice command currently being spoken by a
human speaker. This is because previous non-real-time adver-
sarial attack approaches needed a “preparation stage”, where
the attacker obtains a complete original speech sample, de-
signs specific adversarial perturbations for this sample, and
adds a perturbation to the original sample to build a mali-
cious adversarial example. Then, in the “attack phase”, the
attacker needs to initialize a new session with the target sys-
tem and then replay the prepared malicious adversarial exam-
ple. The application of such an attack is relatively limited,
because during the attack phase, if the user is near the tar-
get system, then no matter how close the malicious sample
1Code and demos are available at https://github.com/
YuanGongND/realtime-adversarial-attack
2www.tensorflow.org/tutorials/sequences/
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time (lower figure) audio adversarial attack.
sounds to a benign sample, it will be suspicious to the user; if
the user is not near the target system, then it is not necessary
to make the malicious sample imperceptible to humans. Fur-
ther, it is not always easy or even possible to initiate a new
session in security-sensitive systems. In contrast, the real-
time adversarial attack scheme does not need a preparation
phase; instead, it continuously processes the speech spoken
by the user and emits the adversarial perturbation, which is
superimposed with the original signal over the air in a real-
time manner. In practice, the attack can be implemented by
placing a device (e.g., a smartphone) equipped with a micro-
phone and a speaker and installed with the real-time attack
software near the target device.
3.2 Adversarial Attack Settings
We perform the non-targeted attack in a semi-black box set-
ting, i.e., we assume that the attacker can call the target model
an unlimited number of times and get the corresponding pre-
dictions and confidence score, but has no knowledge about
the model details (architectures, algorithm, and parameters).
It is a realistic setting for speech recognition system attacks,
because the loss function of many speech recognition models
cannot be differentiable with respect to the input, and most
state-of-the-art systems are cloud-based, which makes it dif-
ficult to obtain full knowledge of the model and perform a
white-box attack. For example, the front end of our target
model is not a neural network, but a set of filter banks extract-
ing Mel-frequency cepstrum features, so it is hard to calcu-
late the gradient of the loss function with respect to the input
waveform, even when we have a copy of the model [Alzan-
tot et al., 2018]; Google Speech is a commercial cloud-based
model which is hard for the attacker to obtain full knowledge
about its design. However, it allows users to upload speech
samples and freely obtain predictions and confidences scores,
which provides opportunities for semi-black box attacks.
In order to emulate a realistic situation, in this example,
we apply the following constraints to the adversarial pertur-
bation. First, we constrain the l0 norm of the adversarial
perturbation, i.e., we limit the number of non-zero points of
the perturbation. This is because limiting the l1 or l2 norm
will make the amplitude of the noise small and does not pose
an over-the-air threat; so it is more reasonable to generate
short, but relatively loud perturbations. Second, we require
that the non-zero points of the perturbations must form clus-
ters as consecutive noise segments. This is because it is im-
possible for an electronic speaker to generate a signal of a
few non-consecutive non-zero points due to the limitation of
its dynamic characteristics. In this sample, we perturb five
0.01-second segments and, for simplicity, the scales of the
points in one segment are fixed and identical (i.e., the noise
frequency is an integral multiple of the sampling frequency),
but each noise segment can be any physically realizable sig-
nal the attack desires. Data points that have amplitudes over 1
are clipped to 1. These two constraints also greatly lower the
computational complexity for the real-time adversarial per-
turbation generator, which now only needs to decide the tim-
ing of emitting each of the five noise segments. In this sam-
ple, we focus on the decision-making process, so we do not
consider the signal attenuation and distortion during transmis-
sion through the air. An illustration of the proposed adversar-
ial perturbation is shown in the upper part of Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the proposed real-time audio adversarial
attack using a real sample. The real-time perturbation generator
continuously predicts the best timing to emit each of the five 0.01-
second adversarial noise segments based on the observation, and
conducts emission immediately once the predicted timing is equal
to or earlier than the current time point. We can observe that the pre-
diction changes dramatically when the speech signal is observed, but
barely changes when the silent period is observed, indicating that the
generator makes decisions mainly based on the informative part of
the signal, and is able to correct them given more observation. The
actual emission time points are shown with red dots in the lower fig-
ure; they are unlikely to be the optimal choice with full observation,
but are the best guess at that time given partial observation.
3.3 The Expert
Since we are performing a semi-black box attack, and to en-
sure realism, we add non-standard constraints to the optimiza-
tion problem. Following the discussion in Section 2.3, we
choose a stochastic optimization based adversarial example
crafting technique as the expert. Specifically, we take the
differential evolution optimization [Storn and Price, 1997],
0 50 100 150 200
Number of Optimization Iterations
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
St
d 
of
 O
pt
im
iza
tio
n 
Re
su
lt 
(se
cs
)
Population size = 10
Population size = 20
Population size = 50
Population size = 100
0 50 100 150 200
Number of Optimization Iterations
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Co
nf
id
en
ce
 D
ro
p
Population size = 10
Population size = 20
Population size = 50
Population size = 100
Figure 6: The standard derivation of the optimization result using
different random seeds (left figure) and the confidence score drop of
the original class led by the expert attack (right figure) with different
numbers for optimization iterations and population size.
which was previously used for the “one-pixel” attack [Su et
al., 2019] on image recognition systems with similar con-
straints to our proposed attack. We extend it for use as audio
attacks, and then use it as the expert. In our case, the can-
didate solution of the optimization is a 5-tuple consisting of
the starting points of each noise segment (sorted). The op-
timization objective is to minimize the confidence score of
the original label. At each iteration, the fitness of each can-
didate solution is calculated and new candidate solutions are
produced using the standard differential evolution formula.
The differential evolution algorithm has two main parame-
ters: the population size and the number of iterations. On one
hand, we want the optimization result to be optimal and deter-
ministic (i.e., the result is invariant to random seeds), which
requires large parameters. On the other hand, the computa-
tional overhead is linearly proportional to the population and
the iteration number, and evaluating the fitness of each can-
didate solution requires calling the DNN based target model
once. Therefore, in order to generate the dataset consisting
of over 20,000 trajectories for imitation learning over a rea-
sonable time, we have to limit the population and the itera-
tion number. As shown in Figure 6, we test the performance
and the standard derivation of the optimization result with dif-
ferent random seeds. We find that population size = 10 and
iteration number = 75 provide a good balance between per-
formance and computational overheads and use these values
in our experiments. For each audio in the training set, we use
the expert to generate a perturbation in the form of a 5-tuple.
Note that each audio consists of 16,000 observations, and thus
forms 16,000 observation-tuple pairs (a decision trajectory),
where the tuple is identical for all observations since the op-
timal perturbation does not change with the observation.
3.4 Training the Real-time Adversarial
Perturbation Generator
Input and Output of the Network
The real-time adversarial perturbation generator is imple-
mented using a deep neural network; the input of the network
is simply an observation o (of variable length), the output of
the network is a 5-tuple of the same definition as the solu-
tion of the differential evolution optimization algorithm, i.e.,
5 time points to emit noise segments. The tuple can be easily
converted to action a using the following rule: if the current
estimated best emission timing is equal to or earlier than the
current time point, then immediately emit the noise.
Layer Name Output Dimension
Input (t, 1)
Framing (dt/160e, 160)
Conv1 / Pooling (dt/160e, 80, 16)
Conv2 / Pooling (dt/160e, 40, 32)
Conv3 / Pooling (dt/160e, 20, 48)
Conv4 / Pooling (dt/160e, 10, 64)
Flatten (dt/160e, 640)
LSTM * 3 (256)
Dense 1 (256)
Dense 2 (128)
Output (5)
Table 1: The network details and the output dimension of each layer.
Batch Processing
The frequency of the speech signal (i.e., 16 kHz) is much
higher than the possible update speed of the real-time adver-
sarial perturbation generator. Therefore, we apply batch pro-
cessing as mentioned in Section 2.3; specifically, the adver-
sarial generator updates every 0.01 second and each update
makes a decision on the actions for 0.01 seconds, so the de-
lay is also 0.01 seconds. Note that while the update period
and noise segment length are identical, they are not related.
The Network Architecture
As shown in Table 1, we use an end-to-end neural network.
Since the input is an observation of variable length t, as a
standard signal processing technique, we cut it into dt/160e
frames, where 160 is the frame length. We then use a se-
ries of convolution and pooling layers to extract the features.
The features of each frame are then sequentially fed into the
long short-term memory (LSTM) [Hochreiter and Schmidhu-
ber, 1997] layers to obtain the encoding, and two dense layers
decode the encoding as the output. This basically follows the
architecture shown in Figure 3: the layers before the LSTM
layers are the encoder, and those after the LSTM layers are
the decoder. We use 1e-3 as the learning rate, mean square
loss, and ADAM optimizer [Kingma and Ba, 2014] for train-
ing. We train data samples in the same trajectory in a batch
to expedite the computations as discussed in Section 2.4.
3.5 Experiments
In our experiments, we test the dataset and target model men-
tioned in Section 3.1. The data is split as follows: we first
hold out 20% of the data as the test set (test set 2) for eval-
uating the attack performance; so it is not seen by the target
model and the attack model. We use the other 80% of the
data to train the target voice recognition model; this same set
is then reused to develop the attack model. Specifically, we
use 75% of this set to train the attack model (attack train-
ing set), 6.25% for validation, and 18.75% for testing (test
set 1). Therefore, test set 1 is seen by the target model, but
not seen by the attack model. We then generate the expert
demonstration of optimal emission timing using the method
mentioned in Section 3.3 for each speech sample in the attack
train set. Since in our setting, the amplitude of each noise seg-
ment is a given fixed value, it is expected (and is proven by
our experiments later) that the expert demonstration of the op-
timal emission timing varies with the given amplitude value
because the emission strategy may be different for different
noise amplitude. In this experiment, we generate two ver-
sions of expert demonstrations using noise amplitude of 0.1
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Figure 7: The attack successful rate and the confidence score drop
led by the attack with different perturbation scale.
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Figure 8: Left: the adversarial perturbation generator’s estimate on
the optimal noise emission timing (shown by color; dark represents
later time, light represents earlier time) of the first noise segment at
each time point. Each row represents one attack trial and 64 trials
are shown in total. Right: the mean prediction error over time.
and 0.5, respectively. Note that although the expert demon-
stration of optimal emission time points are optimized based
on a given noise amplitude, the attacker can emit noise of any
amplitude as desired at these time points in the test phase,
which might lead to a sub-optimal attack performance. We
discuss it in detail in the next section.
We then train the real-time adversarial perturbation gen-
erator to learn from the expert demonstrations using the ap-
proach described in Section 3.4. We use two metrics to eval-
uate the attack performance: 1) attack success rate (in the
non-targeted attack setting, success means that the prediction
of the perturbed sample is different from that of the original
sample) and 2) confidence score drop of the original class led
by the attack (which measures the confidence of the attack).
Overall Result
We show the attack performance on test set 1 of two non-real-
time experts (optimized for perturbation amplitude of 0.1 and
0.5, respectively) and corresponding learned real-time adver-
sarial perturbation generators in Figure 7. We observe that:
First, the attack success rate of the adversarial perturbation
generator is up to 43.5% (when perturbation amplitude is 1),
which is about half of the best non-real-time expert (90.5%)
and clearly outperforms the random noise. For most perturba-
tion amplitudes, the attack success rate of the real-time attack
is 30%-50% of that of the expert.
Second, the attack performance of the expert varies with
the perturbation amplitude it is optimized for. It is not surpris-
ing that the expert optimized for small noise amplitude of 0.1
performs better when the actual emission amplitude is small
(< 0.23) while the expert optimized for large amplitude of 0.5
performs better when the actual emission amplitude is large
(≥ 0.23). This difference also shows in the corresponding
real-time adversarial perturbation generators, but the impact
is much smaller, which gives the attacker a nice property that
the attack performance does not drop much when the actual
and expected noise amplitude are different (e.g., for audio ad-
versarial attacks, it is hard for the attacker to know the actual
amplitude of the noise signal received by the target system
due to signal attenuation, but it does not matter).
Third, we further conduct the same test on the test set 2
(attack success rate up to 42.2%) and have not found a sub-
stantial difference between the result of test set 1 and 2, in-
dicating the attack model can be generalized to data samples
that have not been seen by the target model.
Real-time Dynamics
We next discuss how the proposed adversarial perturbation
generator works in a real-time manner; towards this end, we
plot the dynamics of 64 attack trials for 64 different input
samples in the left part of Figure 8. Each row represents one
attack trial, which shows the adversarial perturbation genera-
tor’s estimate on the optimal emission timing of the first noise
segment at each time point. We place the ground truth on the
right for reference. At the beginning of each attack, when no
data is observed yet, the adversarial perturbation generator
outputs a prior guess which has similar values for different
samples, but with more data observed, the estimate gradu-
ally improves and finally approaches the ground truth. We
can also observe that the amount of observations needed for
correct estimates differs among the trials. This is because
the voice command samples have different lengths of silence
periods at the beginning, which does not contain information
helpful to predict an adversarial perturbation. This can be fur-
ther verified by the detailed dynamics of a real sample shown
in Figure 5, where we can find that the estimation of the ad-
versarial perturbation generator changes dramatically when
the speech signal is observed, but barely changes when the
silent period is observed, indicating the generator makes de-
cisions mainly based on the informative part of the signal, and
is able to correct them given more observation. In this sample,
the estimation does not become stable until half of the speech
signal is observed, but three noise segments are already emit-
ted by this time point, showing the trade-off between the ob-
servation and action space, i.e., the attacker needs to emit the
adversarial noise immediately when the current best-guess
timing with partial observation arrives, otherwise the timing
will pass and the emission cannot be implemented. We also
show the mean absolute prediction error over time in the right
part of Figure 8, which demonstrates that the adversarial gen-
erator indeed improves with more observations.
Error Analysis
Finally, we analyze the error of the real-time adversarial gen-
erator. There are two main types of errors causing the per-
formance gap between the expert and the real-time adversar-
ial generator: prediction error and real-time decision error.
The proposed real-time generator essentially tries to build the
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Figure 9: The distribution of the actual emission timing errors.
mapping between the (partial) input and output of the differ-
ential evolution optimization, while this substantially speeds
up the computing, it is challenging to learn such a map-
ping. Specifically, in our setting, the output of the stochas-
tic optimization algorithm adopted by the expert is not de-
terministic (shown in the left part of Figure 6), which makes
learning such a mapping even harder. As shown in the right
part of Figure 8 and, even after the real-time generator ob-
serves the full data, its prediction still has a certain amount of
prediction errors. Further, as discussed in the previous sec-
tion, the real-time adversarial generator may emit noise seg-
ments when it does not have a reliable estimation due to the
observation-action space tradeoff. We show that the distri-
bution of the actual timing error in Figure 9, which obeys a
zero-centered bell-shaped distribution, and the errors of most
trials are small. Statistically, the mean actual timing error
(i.e., the difference between the actual emission time point
and the expert’s demonstration) is 0.1135 seconds, which is
slightly larger than the prediction error (i.e., the difference
between the predicted emission time point with full observa-
tion and the expert’s demonstration) of 0.1091 seconds. This
indicates that the main error of our attack model is the pre-
diction error, which can be improved by further reducing the
instability of the expert and optimizing the deep neural net-
work architecture. The proposed adversarial perturbation is
audible even when the amplitude is small. It sounds simi-
lar to “usual” noise experienced by electronic speakers (e.g.,
buzzing, interference, etc.), which makes the perturbation ap-
pear not suspicious.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we propose the concept of real-time adversarial
attacks and show how to attack a streaming-based machine
learning model by designing a real-time perturbation gener-
ator that continuously uses observed data to design optimal
perturbations for unobserved data. We use imitation learning
and behavioral cloning algorithm to train the real-time adver-
sarial perturbation generator through the demonstrations of a
state-of-the-art non-real-time adversarial perturbation gener-
ator. The case study (voice command recognition) and re-
sults demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.
Nevertheless, we observe a certain performance gap between
the real-time and the non-real-time adversarial attack when
the basic behavior cloning algorithm is used. In our future
research, we plan to study how to adopt more advanced rein-
forcement learning tools to improve the performance of deci-
sion making process, e.g., when the real-time adversarial per-
turbation generator realizes it has previously made a wrong
decision, could it adjust its future strategy to make it up? On
the other hand, we plan to study the defense strategy to protect
real-time systems against such real-time adversarial attack.
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